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Abstract 
 
 
Annual bonus is a controversial but under-researched dimension of executive pay. 
Bonus packages have the chameleon-like ability to suit CEOs, shareholders or both. 
In other words, they may be consistent with executive power theory and the notion of 
“fat cats” and/or agency theory. As with many other components of executive pay, the 
“devil may be in the detail”, and trends in the particular architecture of schemes may 
prove to be at least as important as aggregate relationships.   
 
This paper presents new results on executive bonuses in the UK’s large firms. The 
agency perspective on the role of executive bonus is supported by the significant, 
aggregate, positive relation between CEO bonus pay and a firm’s financial 
performance. Results for the UK during a unique period of slack capital markets 
produces measures of bonus pay-performance responsiveness that are broadly in line 
with earlier studies. Transparency in bonus schemes (in the sense of simplicity in 
targets) is positively associated with firm performance, as agency theorists would 
predict. This all suggests that CEO bonuses offer a strong and consistent basis for the 
alignment of principals’ and agents’ interests. 
 
However, this apparent support for agency theory should be viewed with caution. 
While bonus simplicity is associated positively with performance, it would appear that 
detailed bonus scheme characteristics are generally insensitive to this relationship. 
Bonus schemes in the UK are becoming more complex in terms of the use of multiple 
targets. There appears to be a trend towards the abandonment of simple schemes with 
unpublished targets, in favour of schemes with more targets, and unpublished ones at 
that. 
 
Of course “Individual Performance Evaluation”, where Boards have some discretion 
over the amount of bonus paid against unpublished or undisclosed targets, may 
succeed in theory, especially where the nature of the business makes it advisable to 
keep CEO targets confidential. Nevertheless, the implication of this paper is that, on 
balance, transparency in the form of simplicity (and associated published targets) is 
positively associated with firm performance. 
 
  
 
  
 The design of reward packages for main board directors is a crucial strategic decision 
for firms, that impinges on the quality of all other strategic decisions. The aim of this 
paper is to investigate and assess the implications of current practice among large UK 
companies in relation to the award of annual bonuses to senior executives. There is a 
long and well documented tradition of empirical enquiry into many aspects of 
executive remuneration, but much of this has focused on the relationship between the 
total pay packages of senior executives and firm performance, plus a range of firm 
level variables such as size and governance characteristics1. 
 
A subsidiary strand of research, starting with Jensen and Murphy 2, has sought to 
isolate the effect of particular elements of pay on this type of relationship. In this 
context, it is perhaps surprising that one of the most established elements of executive 
reward, the annual bonus, has received very limited attention. This paper seeks to 
address this omission by examining contemporary practice in relation to the rationale 
for bonus awards, the size of awards in absolute and relative terms, the impact of 
bonus on the pay-performance relationship and the transparency of practice in relation 
to bonus payments. This research offers a timely insight into bonus practices against a 
backdrop of considerable contemporary disquiet within policymaking and stakeholder 
communities in the UK regarding the terms of senior executives’ contracts and their 
role in influencing the quality of corporate governance. 
 
Although this paper focuses on short term (annual) executive bonus, repeat doses of 
bonus have long term implications, and the following analysis to a large extent 
mirrors the treatment of long term incentives in the literature. It is organised as 
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follows. Section 1 offers a selective overview of the executive compensation 
literature. Section 2 outlines some general features of the architecture of executive 
remuneration in modern UK firms, accounts for the relative absence of bonus-related 
research and identifies specific research questions. Section 3 derives hypotheses 
concerning the links between executive bonus pay and firm performance, Section 4 
describes the methodology and data which offer insights into current UK practice, and 
Section 5 offers an interpretation of the results of the application of this methodology 
to the data. Some concluding remarks and suggestions for extensions to this area of 
research follow. 
 
Previous Studies 
There is a long tradition of empirical investigation into aspects of executive 
remuneration, particularly in the USA. At the risk of oversimplification, much of the 
earlier material in this area sought to explore the relationship between total executive 
pay, variously measured, and a range of firm-level (normally financial) performance 
variables, such as turnover, market and/or accounting performance. The motivation 
for this line of work had its origins in Baumol’s contribution in 19593, which inspired 
a generation of researchers to probe the determinants of executive pay. The focus of 
analysis in early studies was typically on either rewards to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) or to the board as a whole, with the principal components of 
remuneration under scrutiny at first being base salary plus annual bonus. This focus 
reflected the comparatively simple composition of reward packages which invariably 
applied in the USA, and more especially the UK, prior to the 1980s. Later studies 
sought to incorporate long term incentives such as share options, as they became 
established elements of executive pay. 
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 The general consensus4 emerging from this body of work in the USA was that there 
are stronger identifiable correlations between pay and size-related variables, in 
particular turnover, than between pay and performance. (Details of these pay-
performance studies are presented later.) This lent weight to Baumol’s earlier 
conclusions5 and raised the possibility that the design of executive remuneration was 
perhaps influenced by managerialist factors, rather than by efficiency-motivated 
attempts to promote executive-shareholder (principal-agent) interest alignment 
through stronger pay-performance sensitivities. Jensen and Murphy6 concluded that 
(p227) “We believe our results are inconsistent with the implications of formal agency 
models or optimal contracting. The empirical relation between the pay of top-level 
executives and firm performance, while positive and significant, is small for an 
occupation where incentive pay is expected to play an important role.” 
   
Executive Pay in the UK 
Empirical inquiry into executive pay in the UK in the last two decades has had to 
embrace a number of local innovations in remuneration practice. Principally, this has 
involved assembling more comprehensive pay measures which incorporate stock-
based compensation, that is more recently-developed, long-term, performance-
contingent pay elements, notably executive share options (ESOs) and, (specific to the 
UK), long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), which are performance-conditional awards 
of cash or shares (but not options). 
  
Interest in this area has been fuelled by a vigorous contemporary debate in the UK 
regarding, on the one hand, allegedly high absolute levels of executive reward and, on 
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the other, a weak link between pay, performance and shareholder return. Central to 
this debate has been a concern that pay innovations, such as ESOs, offer executives a 
near riskless, and potentially very substantial, increase in total remuneration, 
irrespective of corporate performance, particularly during `bull’ markets. The wider 
context for this body of enquiry has been a growing anxiety regarding the state of the 
`Anglo-American’ model of corporate governance in the light of a series of high 
profile and sometimes catastrophic failures of governance.  In the UK, this anxiety 
has been reflected in a series of influential reports on aspects of corporate governance, 
the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998) and Turnbull (1999) Reports, 
a tradition which has been sustained more recently by the Smith (2003) and Higgs 
(2003) Reports7.  
 
As with executive pay research in the USA, empirical studies in the UK have 
produced mixed results, but the importance of firm size, rather than performance, has 
again been a dominant feature8. Again in line with   
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
the US literature, UK studies have adopted the same two important metrics for 
judging the responsiveness of pay to performance, (see footnote to Table 1). First, 
performance-pay sensitivity measures the absolute response of executive pay to 
changes in shareholder value, though the relative dimensions of the variables 
compromise the usefulness of this measure. Executive pay, even by American 
standards, and particularly changes in pay, are extremely small in relation to 
shareholder value, which is often measured in many billions of dollars for large firms. 
Hence, Jensen and Murphy9 estimated a tiny median sensitivity of 0.0135 for cash 
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pay. This denotes that $1,000 of additional shareholder value is associated with 1.35 
cents of extra pay.  
 
Such absolute measures may appear to trivialise pay-performance relations. Since this 
study addresses executive bonus, which is itself only a small part of executive pay 
compared with long term components such as ESOs, a second, relative measure of 
responsiveness seems to be more illuminating. Therefore, the performance-pay 
elasticity is employed, which relates percentage changes in pay to percentage changes 
in shareholder value. 
 
Prior to this study, estimates of both pay sensitivity and elasticity (see Table 1) for the 
UK produced results rather lower than those observed in the USA. Thus, for salary, 
bonus and ESOs, Conyon and Murphy10 calculate a sensitivity of 2.33 compared with 
6.00 for the USA11, whilst elasticity in the UK (0.121) bore a similar relation to 
elasticity in the USA (0.39) in these studies.   
 
Ironically, when comprehensive valuations of LTIPs were estimated for the UK12, it 
was found that LTIPs (embodying performance conditions that were supposed to 
increase sensitivity) were associated with the opposite effect, with sensitivity as low 
as 1.55. Such an outcome is not inconsistent with self-serving executives designing 
soft LTIP performance conditions for themselves that weakened the performance-pay 
link. 
 
A clue to this phenomenon is provided by the title of the DTI Consultative Document 
“Reward for Failure?”13. There is some suggestion here that the opaqueness of LTIP 
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schemes, in terms of their complexity and the lack of an easily observable link 
between share price and rewards (as is the case with ESOs) has weakened their link 
with performance. Many LTIPs reward average performance14 and often rely upon 
comparator groups of companies as yardsticks. Evidence from the USA15 has 
certainly demonstrated that executives there have manipulated the composition of 
such groups, apparently to make their firm’s performance look better. Such 
managerial discretion could be interpreted as being part of the general issue of 
“camouflage”16, discussed later in respect to executive bonuses. Whether or not the 
detail of scheme design represents a wilful attempt to frustrate effective shareholder 
scrutiny of pay arrangements, it may be argued that scheme complexity fails to offer a 
clear incentive to eligible executives in the sense that incentives need to be 
transparent in order to be effective. 
 
The degree of attention afforded to the scrutiny of such stock-based compensation, 
and ESOs in particular, in the last twenty years is in stark contrast to that given to the 
scrutiny of annual bonuses. It is a contention of this paper that this unevenness should 
be addressed, particularly as in recent times UK companies have found stock-based 
compensation a less useful and attractive tool for rewarding executives, given the 
unfavourable performance of equity markets. Now, there is at least a suspicion that 
they may be turning instead to the annual bonus as a source of softer rewards. 
 
Bonuses were, of course, an element of UK pay practice long before recent anxieties 
regarding corporate governance arrangements in UK companies became an issue, but 
equally there has often been a tolerance of bonuses as a less transparent form of 
reward than long term incentives. It has been argued, for example, that it is entirely   
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appropriate for annual bonus to be based on individual, confidential terms that are 
related to measures of internal performance at an individual, divisional or company 
level. For example, “Individual Performance Evaluation” is fashionable in the USA, 
where some discretion is left to the Board over the amount of bonus paid. This applies 
to around 42% of the CEO bonuses of large firms in the USA17.  
 
Probably as a result of arguments citing the sensitive commercial nature of bonus 
targets, the regulation of bonuses has been relatively weak in the UK. Thus, the 2003 
Combined Code18 bundles annual bonuses together with other performance-related 
forms of pay, and states that all incentives should be subject to “challenging 
performance conditions”, and “performance conditions should be relevant, stretching 
and designed to enhance the business”. However, no detailed regulations exist 
specifically for bonus performance conditions. 
 
Whatever the relative merits of undisclosed targets or bonus targets which are 
transparent to shareholders, however, an agency perspective would suggest that any 
changes to bonus schemes in terms of the form of payment (cash or shares) or more 
transparent performance targets should be expected to raise pay-performance 
sensitivity without necessarily raising pay-outs. Greater transparency may be expected 
to expose executives to more shareholder supervision, providing another incentive for 
CEOs to act in the interest of shareholders, again raising pay-performance sensitivity.    
 
Clearly, however, this relative lack of regulation and transparency offers at least the 
opportunity for levels of individual reward that might otherwise attract concern or 
criticism and is this also forms part of the case for more detailed academic enquiry. In 
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line with the literature on long-term incentives, the focus here is on any links between 
executive bonus payments and firm performance.  
 
Hypotheses 
In developing hypotheses that might offer an insight into the contemporary impact of 
bonus payments to UK executives, it is instructive to consider alternative theoretical 
perspectives on executive pay which give rise to expectations of distinct empirical 
outcomes. The agency perspective19, otherwise known as the arm’s-length contracting 
approach20 is dominant. It underpins the analysis of governance in general and 
executive remuneration in particular, and sees remuneration design as part of the 
wider governance landscape, in terms of its potential to align the conflicting 
objectives of principals and agents, shareholders and executives. To the extent that 
alignment is realised, both individual components of pay, and aggregate pay, might be 
expected to be positively correlated to firm-level performance measures such as total 
shareholder return21. 
 
However, a rather different perspective assigns a more significant role to managerial 
power as an influence on the design of executive pay. Here, the exercise of power 
would be evidenced by managerial rent extraction at the expense of principals, 
resulting in weak alignment between pay and firm performance and by levels of 
executive reward which are resilient to periods of poor corporate performance22. 
 
It should be noted that, whilst these competing agency and managerial power 
perspectives are frequently characterised as representing quite distinct views on 
corporate governance, agency theorists would tend to view managerial power as no 
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more than a special case of the agency relation, which is likely to apply where 
governance institutions and processes are weak. For the purposes of this paper, 
however, whether or not the managerial power perspective is seen as a variant of 
agency is not an issue. 
 
In terms of aggregate bonus payments and performance, the agency perspective 
forms the basis of our first hypothesis, while a managerial power approach would 
suggest its negation:  
 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between levels of bonus paid to 
executives and company performance. 
 
This hypothesis mirrors similar hypotheses proposed in the general literature on 
executive pay (including share options). It may be tested in terms of changes in 
aggregate reward and firm performance, but it focuses only on the overall financial 
relationship between bonus and corporate performance. The literature in relation to 
stock-based compensation would argue, however, that it is just as important to 
investigate the relationships between the micro-institutional features of bonus 
schemes and firm performance, as well as aggregate relations. To the extent that the 
importance of bonus as a pay component is increasing, in the context of ineffective 
stock-based compensation during flat periods in equity markets, detailed aspects of 
bonus arrangements become a natural focus for scrutiny by academic researchers as 
well as shareholder groups and the media. In particular, there is a perception that 
scheme award criteria may be motivated principally by executive power and a desire 
to achieve higher levels of effectively guaranteed payments.  
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 It was observed earlier that the conditions (or targets) which determine levels of 
bonus payment are diverse, individual and inconsistent in transparency across 
companies. Whilst this presents some difficulties for comparative analysis, it is 
possible to develop a classification which discriminates between, on the one hand, 
those companies that rely on transparent or external criteria and, on the other, those 
that employ largely opaque (unpublished and internal) criteria for bonus award, as 
well as between those that use single and those employing multiple targets.  
 
Indeed, Bebchuk and Fried23 use their managerial power perspective to argue that 
executives use “camouflage”, by “dressing, packaging and hiding” additional rent 
extraction, thus obscuring higher pay-outs and making bonuses seem more 
performance-based than they actually are. In relation to executive bonus, three 
dimensions seem relevant to this concept of camouflage. Transparency (the negation 
of camouflage) could be associated with (a) simple targets (with one instead of 
multiple performance conditions), (b) published targets and (c) cash payments (as 
opposed to shares and other instruments further from cash). 
 
Agency theorists would predict that transparent bonus conditions (i.e. cash-only 
rewards, simple and published targets) would encourage executives to act like 
shareholders. Similarly, managerial power theorists would emphasise that opaque 
schemes (non-cash, with multiple and unpublished targets) represent opportunities for 
executives to conceal rent-extraction at the expense of shareholders.  
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Both sets of theory would imply that bonus scheme characteristics of 
transparency/camouflage would be complementary. In other words, executives intent 
on camouflage would not use single targets based on published performance 
indicators. Instead they would use a multiplicity of unpublished targets. 
 
Thus, we propose: 
 
H2: Bonus scheme characteristics associated with bonus transparency (and 
camouflage) are predicted to occur simultaneously in actual executive bonus 
schemes. 
 
From the power and agency perspectives, excess rents associated with guaranteed 
income schemes camouflaged as bonus schemes (without transparency) are unlikely 
to provide executives with the incentives needed to raise firm performance. Thus:  
 
H3: Transparency in bonus schemes (however measured) will be negatively 
associated with bonus pay-outs. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data on CEO rewards, firm performance in terms of shareholders’ return and control 
variables (number of employees, industry dummy and American or otherwise 
nationality of CEOs) were collected from the annual reports of FTSE 350 companies 
(minus investment or unit trusts) for financial years 2002 and 2003. This left 299 
firms, yielding a panel of 257 firms that had executive bonus schemes for each year. 
Of these 257, 119 reported some change in scheme between 2002 and 2003. 
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This two-year panel of data enabled two cross-section analyses to be employed. A 
reliable measure of performance-bonus sensitivity requires estimation of the average 
performance-bonus relationship across two moments in time.          
 
Bonus schemes were classified according to the types of targets used, see Table 2. 
INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
 For example, the most transparent schemes are based on share price alone (ET), or on 
some published variable (e.g. net profit or total sales) that may be verified from 
annual reports (called published internal target, PIT). Table 2 shows that there were 
85 cases in 2002/03 of firms with publicly disclosed targets. Less transparent schemes 
used unpublished internal targets (UIT, 77 firms) and even, in 22 cases, completely 
undisclosed targets, presumably for reasons of commercial secrecy. All other cases 
involved combinations of published and unpublished targets.   
 
For performance relations (H1 and H3), GLS in STATA was used to estimate the 
following equation: 
tiiitiLiC
ti
uxxx
Salary
BonusLog .1,,1,0
,
)(1 εβββ ++−++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +     (1) 
for observations 2,1=t  on firms 257,...,1=i (514 cases overall). The vector xi,t 
consisted of values of explanatory factors for firm i in year t. It included: 
1) Firm performance indicators: EPS, TSR and Log of number of employees. 
2) Bonus design factors: 
a) If bonus is paid in cash only, CASH dummy 
b) type of target (ET, PIT, UIT or undisclosed target) see above. UIT was 
used as a base or reference dummy. 
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c) Only one performance target (SIMPLE) 
3) Control variables: 
a) American nationality or other foreign nationality of CEO 
b) Sector dummy for finance sector, FINANCE 
 
In addition to these regressions concerning firm performance and executive bonus, the 
database was used to produce descriptive results that cast light on H2. 
 
Results 
 
Table 3 describes features of the balanced sample (n=257) for 2001/02 and 2002/03. 
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
It is clear that average (mean) executive bonus is no longer a trivial component of 
total cash pay, representing 61.0% of salary in 2001/02, rising to 67.2% in 2002/03. 
This is consistent with a new emphasis on annual bonus during a period of relatively 
static stock market prices and tight regulation of long term incentives. 
INSERT TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
Table 4 shows the main regression results for the CEOs of 257 UK firms, 2001/02 and 
2002/03. The results of the two cross-section regressions are discussed in relation to 
H1 and H3, but first we address the control variables.  
 
Firms in the finance sector clearly show a tendency towards higher cash pay, after 
allowing for performance. Similarly, firms with non-British CEOs seem to offer a 
cash pay premium, but only in our second year. Unusually, firm size is insignificant 
throughout, and this contrasts with its significance in all earlier studies24. However, 
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these studies addressed total pay (including option valuations) or cash pay (salary plus 
bonus) and no previous study focused exclusively on bonus. It would appear that 
bonus is one element of CEO pay which is not rigidly linked to firm size, offering 
more potential for influence from performance. (In this study, the transformation of 
the bonus variable employed eliminates the influence of size on bonus pay.) 
 
Generally, the regressions provide consistent support for H1, the influence of firm 
performance and the agency theory that underpins it. Both measures of firm 
performance (EPS and TSR) are shown to be positively and significantly associated 
with bonus pay. In order to compare directly the responsiveness of bonus pay to the 
results for other countries and periods cited in Table 1, the coefficients on TSR in 
Table 4 were converted into sensitivities and elasticities (see footnotes to Table 1). 
Given the magnitude of shareholder value (with the median firm’s market 
capitalisation of £1.446 billion in 2002/03) and CEO pay, it has been observed that 
sensitivities (the absolute increase in CEO pay associated with a £1,000 increase in 
shareholder value) are bound to be low. In the case of this study, a £1,000 increase in 
shareholder value is associated with a median 2.12 pence increase in CEO pay, which 
yields a quite low pay-performance sensitivity of 0.0212. This corresponds with the 
0.0135 sensitivity calculated by Jensen and Murphy (1990) for salary and bonus, see 
Table 1. 
 
As noted above, these quite trivial sensitivities (as a result of the shareholder value 
and executive bonus magnitudes) suggest that a relative rather than an absolute 
measure of responsiveness may be more enlightening. Pay-performance elasticities 
were therefore calculated, representing the percentage change in CEO pay associated 
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with a percentage change in shareholder value. Over the two years, a 10% change in 
TSR was associated with a 2.19% increase in bonus, i.e. an elasticity of 0.219. It can 
be seen from Table 1 that this is almost exactly the same result as the 0.22 calculated 
for cash pay in the USA, 1980-94 by Hall and Liebman25, and very close to the 0.26 
estimated by Conyon and Benito (1999) for the UK, 1990-96. 
 
This close correspondence of pay-performance elasticities (and sensitivities) for cash 
pay across different time periods and countries offers strong support for H1 and the 
agency perspective. However, a consideration of H2 and other hypotheses, when the 
detailed structure of executive bonus schemes is examined, is less supportive of 
agency theory. 
 
Leaving aside H2 for the moment, H3 predicted that different dimensions of bonus 
scheme transparency (simplicity, published targets and cash rewards) would be 
associated with more shareholder control and lower levels of absolute pay. However, 
the particular type of target applied (PIT, ET or UIT) was found to have no significant 
association with the bonus variable, and cash pay only has the expected association 
(5% significant) for the second year, 2002-03. Nevertheless, target simplicity is 
negatively and significantly associated with bonus pay for both years, with simple 
targets being associated with lower pay-outs. On average over the two years, simple 
targets are associated with 10-11% lower cash pay for CEOs. Whilst such limited 
support for H3 would appear to endorse, to a degree, the agency view, a consideration 
of H2 provides new insights into executive bonus pay, and raises doubts about the 
efficacy of agency theory in the long term.  
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The relations between the characteristics of bonus schemes are complex, but the 
picture emerges of an increasingly polarisation in forms of bonus package. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
For example, Table 5 shows that in 2001/02, 81 CEOs had a single performance 
target, and that in 57 of these cases, the single target was a published one. As the 
number of targets increases, they are less likely to be published.  
 
By 2002/03, 19 firms had left the single target category, although ten of these 19 had 
unpublished targets previously. Of the seven firms which reduced the number of 
targets employed to one, five had a published target. This emphasises the polarisation, 
with simple (one target) schemes tending to use published conditions. In other words, 
two bonus characteristics (simplicity and published targets) associated with 
transparency (and less camouflage) are generally found to occur simultaneously in 
actual executive bonus schemes. To this extent, H2 is supported. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Interpreting the significance of these results is not straightforward. An advocate of the 
agency perspective on the role of executive bonus would draw positive inferences 
from the significant relationship overall between CEO bonus pay and a firm’s 
financial performance. Results for the UK during a unique period of slack capital 
markets produce measures of bonus pay-performance responsiveness that are broadly 
in line with earlier studies. Furthermore, transparency in bonus schemes (in the sense 
of simplicity in targets) is positively associated with firm performance, as agency 
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theorists would predict. This all suggests that CEO bonuses offer a strong and 
consistent basis for the alignment of principals’ and agents’ interests. 
 
However, this apparent support for agency theory should be viewed with caution. 
While bonus simplicity is associated positively with performance, it would appear that 
detailed bonus scheme characteristics are generally insensitive to this relationship. 
Bonus schemes in the UK continue to become more complex in terms of the use of 
multiple targets. There appears to be a trend towards abandonment of simple schemes 
with unpublished targets in favour of schemes with more targets, and unpublished 
ones at that. 
 
Of course “Individual Performance Evaluation”, where Boards have some discretion 
over the amount of bonus paid against unpublished or undisclosed targets, may 
succeed in theory, especially where the nature of the business makes it advisable to 
keep CEO targets confidential. Nevertheless, the implication of this paper is that, on 
balance, transparency in the form of simplicity (and associated published targets) 
generates the best results. 
 
Future research may do well to focus on the long term tracking of bonus schemes 
against performance, particularly those that have been subjected to change. Of course, 
more than two cross-sections of data are needed for this task, and this is a substantial 
weakness of this paper. At the same time, another year of data requires about one 
researcher-year of data retrieval and inputting. 
 
 17
 CEO bonus still has the chameleon-like ability to suit CEOs, shareholders or both. As 
with many other components of executive pay, the “devil may be in the detail”, and 
trends in the particular architecture of schemes may prove to be at least as important 
as aggregate relationships. 
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TABLE 1:  Estimates of Median Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivities and 
Elasticities Compared 
 
Researcher(s) 
(date) 
Country 
(Years studied) 
Performance-Pay 
Sensitivity1
Performance-Pay 
Elasticity2
Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) (Salary and 
bonus only) 
USA 
(1974-1986) 
 
0.0135 
 
- 
Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) 
USA 
(1974-1986) 
 
3.25 
 
- 
Hall & Liebman 
(1998) (Salary and 
Bonus only) 
USA 
(1980-1994) 
 
- 
 
0.22 
Hall & Liebman 
(1998)  
USA 
(1980-1994) 
 
6.00 
 
0.39 
Benito & Conyon 
(1999) (Salary and 
Bonus only) 
UK 
(1990-1996) 
 
- 
 
0.26 
 
Conyon & Murphy 
(2000) 
UK 
(1997) 
 
2.33 
 
0.121 
Buck et al. (2003) UK 
(1998) 
1.55 - 
Current Study 
(2005) (Bonus only) 
UK  
(2001/02, 2002/03) 
 
0.0212 
 
0.219 
 
1Performance-Pay Sensitivity shows the absolute increment to pay associated with a 1,000 unit (e.g. 
$) increase in shareholder value, so a sensitivity of 0.0135 (for salary and bonus, Jensen and Murphy, 
1990) denotes that an additional $1,000 of shareholder value is associated with a 1.35 cents of 
additional executive pay. It is calculated by regressing changes in executive pay on changes in 
shareholder value.   
 
2Performance-Pay Elasticity shows the % responsiveness of pay to a % change in performance. For 
example, an elasticity of 0.10 denotes that a CEO associated with a 20% rate of return would be paid 
1% more than a CEO associated with 10% (Hall and Liebman, 1998, p 654). It is calculated by 
regressing the change in the log of executive pay on change in the log of shareholder value. 
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TABLE 2: Performance Targets, 2002/03 
 
 Number of performance targets (2002-03)       
Performance 
target types N/A 1 2 3 4 
Row 
total 
ET 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ET & PIT 0 0 3 4 0 7 
ET & PIT & 
UIT 0 0 0 3 6 9 
ET & UIT 0 0 5 1 1 7 
PIT 0 57 19 8 1 85 
PIT & UIT 0 0 47 48 20 115 
UIT 0 19 29 10 3 61 
Undisclosed 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Column total 10 76 103 74 31 294 
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TABLE 3  Mean/Median CEO Salary and Bonus, 257 FTSE350 firms.  
 
Year 
Average (median) 
salary £ 
Average (median) 
bonus figure, £ 
Average (median) 
salary + bonus, £ 
2001-02 400,675 (356,000) 
244,321 
(130,000) 
644,996 
(496,000) 
2002-03 447,072 (403000) 
300,323 
(170,500) 
747,394 
(569,000) 
Average 
over two 
years 
423,873 
(385,500) 
272,322 
(139,500) 
696,195 
(529,500) 
 
Note: median salary plus median bonus does not sum to median (salary + bonus) 
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TABLE 4. CEO Annual Bonus and Firm Performance 
 
2001-02 cross-sectional model 2002-03 cross-sectional model 
 Coef. Robust Std. Err.  Coef. Robust Std. Err. 
EPS 0.001773(**) 0.000562 EPS 0.001614(*) 0.000649 
TSR 0.147541(**) 0.046713 TSR 0.097742(*) 0.041613 
Fi
rm
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
Firm SIZE -0.00428 0.012957 Firm SIZE 0.013472 0.012511 
SIMPLE -0.10178(*) 0.042594 SIMPLE -0.11195(**) 0.041858 
PIT -0.023 0.050114 PIT 0.046021 0.056009 
ET -0.01709 0.076182 ET 0.167213 0.139683 
UIT (base) (base) UIT (base) (base) 
Undisclosed 0.023924 0.108638 Undisclosed -0.18406 0.101119 
B
on
us
 
sc
he
m
e 
de
si
gn
 
CASH -0.06612 0.045523 CASH -0.08963(*) 0.045201 
American 0.258619 0.181132 American 0.32845(*) 0.16278 
Other foreign 
nationality 0.193321 0.108929 
Other 
foreign 
nationality 
0.207882(*) 0.086656 
FINANCE 0.324163(**) 0.10144 FINANCE 0.33126(**) 0.109236 
Constant 0.418163(**) 0.121335 Constant 0.255773(*) 0.127276 
C
on
tr
ol
 
va
ria
bl
es
, t
im
e 
tr
en
d 
an
d 
co
ns
ta
nt
 
      
 N= 257  N= 257  
 F-stat. F(11,245)=6.14  F-stat. F(11,245)=4.98  
 R2 24 %   R2 25 %   
       
* - 5 %, ** - 1 % significance level    
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TABLE 5 Number and Types of Bonus Performance Targets (2001-02) 
 
 Number of performance targets  
Performance 
Target Types N/A 1 2 3 4
Row 
total 
ET 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ET & PIT 0 0 2 1 0  3 
ET & PIT & UIT 0 0 0 4 2 6 
ET & UIT 0 0 2 1 1 4 
PIT 0 57 18 7 0  82 
PIT & UIT 0 0 36 32 12 80 
UIT 0 24 37 14 2 77 
Undisclosed 22 0 0 0 0  22 
Column total 22 81 95 59 17 274 
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